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I. INTRODUCTION
Many postulated that 2010 would drastically alter the landscape of
subject matter eligibility under § 101 of the Patent Act, finally
1
providing clarity to this area of the law. Despite such hopes, this
anticipation was eventually met with the realization that perhaps the
judiciary is not the appropriate vehicle to provide meaningful answers
2
to the ambiguities inherent in patent law. The Federal Circuit’s decision
3
in Prometheus v. Mayo represented what should be the final significant
§ 101 case to impact process patents for diagnostic testing. Despite the
multitude of case law before the courts last year, patentees are still left
with the same uncertainty that existed when this issue developed at the
4
forefront of patent disputes several years ago. Although the Supreme
5
Court’s consideration of Bilski v. Kappos determined that the machineor-transformation (hereinafter “MOT”) test created by the Federal
Circuit would no longer represent the exclusive standard for which
6
method patents may be measured, courts remain encumbered by
decades-worth of patent eligibility tests and no definitive formula to
apply such standards.
Despite this lack of clarity, the progression of case law
demonstrates the likelihood that diagnostic method claims will pass
muster under § 101 where such claims are determined not to preempt a
fundamental principle. This illuminates the concern that where such
methods are deemed patentable, liability will attach where a physician
performs a patented diagnostic method. Rather than leaving this matter
to the courts, resulting in protracted litigation and fostering uncertainty
among would-be patentees, the appropriate solution may lie with
Congress. Over the past ten years, legislation has been introduced in
Congress aimed at preventing physicians from facing legal
consequences due to their use of patented genetic testing, in terms of
1
Dan Vorhaus & John Conley, Bilski and Biotech: Business As Usual, For Now,
GENOMIC LAW REPORT (June 28, 2010), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php
/2010/06/28/bilski-and-biotechnology/.
2
Prometheus v. Mayo, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Dan Vorhaus & John Conley,
Prometheus Unbound — Again, GENOMIC LAW REPORT (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/12/17/prometheus-unbound-again/.
3
Prometheus, 628 F.3d 1347.
4
Subject matter eligibility was a key issue in the Federal Circuit’s ruling in In re Bilski,
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
5
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
6
Id. at 3227.
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both the patented composition of matter and the diagnostic tests relating
7
to such genetic determinations. While the extensive nature of such
8
legislation may have deleterious consequences for gene-based patents,
it can provide instruction for a more narrowly tailored legislative effort
to exempt physicians from infringement liability in certain situations.
In the past, where a patent claim met one of the defined categories
— machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or process — the
9
claim was presumed eligible under § 101. In fact, regarding
biotechnical claims, “[s]o long as there was some element of human
intervention, such as isolation of a gene sequence or genetic engineering
of a living organism, biotechnology inventions were generally assumed
10
to be eligible for patent protection.” With the rapid development of
biotechnology and the related patents, so too grows the fear that such
inventions cover not only human discoveries, but also the natural
biological associations upon which the inventions are claimed.
The concern for patentees generated by the recent § 101 debate is
twofold. First, there is still a fear that the Federal Circuit will continue
to apply the MOT test based on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of
11
the test as an “investigative tool.” Second, if the patentability of
diagnostic methods is put into doubt, this will severely disincentivize
funding for research and development. On the other end of the
spectrum, opponents of a more broadly defined patentability
requirement fear the detrimental effects that the privatization of
diagnostic testing will have on the healthcare industry, both in terms of
patient care and rising costs. The inherent conflict created for physicians
may,
[I]nhibit doctors from using their best medical judgment; . . . force
doctors to spend unnecessary time and energy to enter into license
agreements; . . . divert resources from the medical task of healthcare
7

See Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter GRAA]; Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R.
3967, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter GRDAA].
8
See infra Part IV(B) and (C).
9
Maayan Filmar, A Critique of In Re Bilski, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 11, 11 (2009) (“Industrial age inventions fell easily into at least one of these four
statutory categories. Information age inventions, however, complicate the analysis under
section 101 and blur the boundaries of its enumerated categories.”).
10
Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Bilski on Biotechnology, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH
IP BLOG, (Jul. 3, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2010/07
/impact-of-bilski-on-biotechnology.html.
11
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
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to the legal task of searching patent files for similar simple
correlations; [and,] raise the cost of healthcare while inhibiting its
12
effective delivery.

This Note concludes that the Patent Office and courts will continue
to find diagnostic tests patent-eligible based on recent case law. In an
effort to better balance the competing policy rationales between
bestowing inventors with necessary property rights in their inventions,
and a physician’s right to give — and a patient’s corresponding right to
receive — a proper medical diagnosis, Congress should impose
meaningful limitations on liability for physicians who perform such
tests. While performance would still constitute patent infringement,
liability would not attach for physicians as it would if the patented tests
were performed in a research setting.
This Note will begin in Part II with a discussion of the relevant
statutory provisions within the Patent Act, specifically the subject
matter eligibility requirement and its application to process claims. Part
III will discuss the case law leading up to the Federal Circuit’s decision
in Prometheus II. Part IV will introduce the Medical Practitioner
Exception and legislative measures that could amend the exception to
better serve the relevant policy rationales. This Note will conclude in
Part V that certain amendments can be made to the Medical Practitioner
Exception that would allow diagnostic methods to retain patentability so
crucial to the biotechnology industry, but afford physicians a modicum
of protection where patented methods are used in the course of
diagnosis or treatment of patients.
II. PATENT ELIGIBILITY AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The Patent Act’s subject matter requirement, § 101, ensures that a
claim is derived from discoveries or inventions in which human
13
innovation acted as the primary driver. Even with this limitation, the
subject matter requirement has been read broadly by the Supreme Court
14
to make patentable “anything under the sun that is made by man,” with
narrow exclusions for natural phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract
12

Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite, 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
13
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2008). “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” Id.
14
S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952).
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15

ideas. This line is often blurred in medical and biotechnical patent
claims due to the complex endeavor of melding scientific inquiry and
16
discovery with the laws of nature. Frequently the ineffective
distinction between what constitutes a natural, as opposed to man-made,
process forms the basis for process claim rejections.
While common sense definitions of machine, manufacture and
composition of matter are generally uncontested, defining what
constitutes a “process claim” remains somewhat more complicated.
17
Although § 100(b) provides a statutory definition, case law provides a
more detailed attempt to distill the components of a process. The
18
Supreme Court, in Cochrane v. Deener, found that a process is “a
mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. . .[and]
it is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be
19
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.” From this, the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have enunciated several tests for
process claims, but cautioned against limiting the inquiry to a single
20
test. Despite differences among these tests, each has been understood
to represent the rule against patenting natural phenomena, laws of
21
nature, and abstract ideas.
III. 35 U.S.C. § 101: THE SHIFT IN THE SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBILITY DOCTRINE FOR PROCESS PATENTS AS IT HAS
DEVELOPED BEFORE AND AFTER BILSKI AND
PROMETHEUS
Originally, the term “useful art” as it is applied in § 101 was
22
thought to refer to technological innovation. Courts have long referred
to patent protection as existing specifically to ensure technological

15

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
Jeffery M. Kuhn, Patentable Subject Matter Matters: New Uses for an Old Doctrine,
22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 89, 103 (2007).
17
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2008). “The term ‘process’ means process, art, or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material.” Id.
18
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 780 (1876).
19
Id.
20
See infra Part II(B).
21
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
22
In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760
F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
16
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23

expansion and innovation. Although never explicitly cabining patent
law to a particular field, “several of [the Supreme Court’s] decision[s]
24
implicitly tether patentability to technological innovations.” This
narrow view of available subject matter has since expanded opening up
the possibility that § 101 can cover any process, no matter the field from
25
which it is derived.
Beginning in 1980, the Supreme Court embarked on what has been
three decades of patent-eligibility expansion, starting with its rulings in
26
27
Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Diamond v. Diehr. In Chakrabarty, the
Court was faced with a reoccurring patent eligibility question regarding
engineered bacteria. Chakrabarty “manufactured” bacteria capable of
breaking down the components of crude oil, extremely useful in the
28
cleanup of oil spills. These particular bacteria did not previously exist
in nature and no other existing bacteria was said to perform the same
function. The Court had faced the issue of engineered bacteria several
29
decades earlier in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
where the majority found that although the bacteria in question did not
exist in nature, the inventor simply sought to patent nature’s handiwork
30
through the combination of living organisms. The holding in
Chakrabarty, in contrast, specifically found that human-made living
organisms satisfied § 101.
While declining to specifically overrule Funk Brothers, its
continued viability in light of Chakrabarty is put into doubt. The Court
stressed the difference as lying in human intervention — whereas in
Funk Brothers the claim was drawn to bacteria resulting from a mixture
of selected strains the result of which failed to produce different
characteristics, Chakrabarty intentionally intervened to create a new
31
strain of bacteria with traits never before observed. Perhaps the real
fault with the underlying claim in Funk Brothers was the failure of the
23

Bilksi, 545 F.3d at 1001 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1002 (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)).
25
State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
26
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
27
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
28
Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. at 305.
29
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
30
Id.
31
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
24
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32

new bacteria to meet the usefulness requirement. In determining that
the bacteria constituted a product of nature, the Court relied on a finding
33
that the organisms “perform[ed] in their natural way.” Therefore,
instead of first examining the patent for its subject matter, the Court
combined an analysis under §101 with an obviousness analysis properly
34
construed under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Since the bacteria had not existed in
that particular form prior to the combination of the selected strains it is
hard to characterize the result as a product of nature.
Chief Justice Burger declined the invitation inherent in the
petitioner’s argument to engage in a balancing test considering the
hazards of allowing patent rights in certain subject matter versus the
35
goal of promoting progress in the useful arts. Instead, Justice Burger
stressed the importance of such concerns and the inability of the Court
to entertain such policy matters which are better left for “resolution
within the legislative process after the kind of investigation,
examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts
36
cannot.” The Court’s task is simply to determine Congress’ meaning
through its words and intent, and “once that is done [the Court’s]
37
powers are exhausted.”
In the year following Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court confronted
another § 101 issue in Diamond v. Diehr, this time involving a process

32

See generally Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) “Unless and until a
process is refined and developed to this point — where specific benefit exists in currently
available form — there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross
what may prove to be a broad field.” Id.
33
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
34
See Brief for Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants
at 13, Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., No. 20101406 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/alnylamamicus-brief.pdf.
The terminology used before the 1952 Patent Act speaks of ‘invention’ to
describe the necessary advance in the art beyond novelty to establish
patentability. This was superseded four years later in the 1952 Patent Act by the
statutory test of ‘nonobviousness’ under what is today Section 103(a). Prior to
the 1952 Patent Act, an invention which was ‘obvious’ was instead termed to
lack patentable ‘invention.’ In Funk [Bros.] the Court found a patent to a
mixture of known bacteria lacked ‘invention’ − in other words, that it was
obvious.
Id.
35
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S at 317.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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38

claim. The patent application in Diehr claimed a method for molding
rubber into specific forms using a mathematical equation to determine
39
when the molds had properly cured. The Court determined that a
process utilizing a mathematical formula is not rendered unpatentable
when it also transforms or reduces an article to a different state or
40
thing. Although the process incorporated the Arrhenius equation into
its claim to calculate the relationship between time and temperature in
the cooling process, a “process is not unpatentable simply because it
41
contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.”
This decision paved the way for biological and medical patents
currently flooding into the system. The Court seems to be borrowing a
theme from copyright law which recognizes copyright protection for
42
compilations. Although independently some or all of the components
of a compilation might belong to the public domain, together they may
constitute a work of original authorship. While patent law differs in
many respects from copyright law, the underlying policy concept is
similar — that which belongs in the public domain cannot be usurped
43
into a privatized right. So long as a claim is read in its entirety and not
in terms of its constituent parts considered apart from the whole, a claim
for a process involving a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
44
idea can still satisfy a § 101 inquiry.
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s ruling in State Street v. Signature
Financial Group, several opinions construing § 101 referenced a
judicially-created doctrine in finding business methods ineligible for
45
patent protection. The system at issue in State Street concerned a “hub
and spoke” investment strategy whereby several mutual funds would
pool their resources into a central portfolio thereby decreasing
38

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
Id.
40
Id. at 184.
41
Id. at 187 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
42
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978). A “‘compilation’ is a work formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated,
or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship.” Id.
43
See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (introducing the idea/expression
dichotomy into American Copyright jurisprudence, stating that ideas themselves are not
copyrightable, while original expression is subject to copyright protection).
44
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193.
45
State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
39
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administrative costs and benefiting from the tax benefits associated with
46
partnership. The district court dispensed with the patent claim on
summary judgment relying on the “business method exception,” or in
47
the alternative the “mathematical algorithm exception.” On appeal to
the Federal Circuit, the court refused to endorse a judicially-created
exception to § 101, stating that “it was Congress’s intent not to place
any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be
48
obtained beyond those specifically recited” in the statute. Looking at
the plain language of the statute, the Congressional record and the
49
Manual of Patent Examining Procedures, Judge Rich inferred that
without express limitations dictated by Congress, the “first door” to
patentability should be left wide open, thereby striking down the
50
“exceptions” relied on by the lower court.
Returning to language from Chakrabarty and Diehr, the court
stressed that beneath all processes lies a mathematical equation, a law of
51
nature or an abstract idea. While those underlying concepts or ideas are
not patentable, that which is created utilizing such knowledge can be
subject to patent protection so long as it meets the other requirements of
the Patent Act, specifically novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate
52
notice and disclosure. The court correctly identified that although the
claimed method in State Street may be overly broad, this is not a
53
requirement under § 101, but rather under §§ 102, 103, and 112.
Considered as the turning point in the expansion of the subject matter
eligibility discussion, the State Street opinion received endless criticism
54
and is subject to continued debate.
The development of patentable subject matter for processes has
greatly increased in breadth over the past half century to include various

46

Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1372.
48
Id. at 1373.
49
Id. at 1377 (quoting Examination Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 (1996)
(“Claims should not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead such claims
should be treated like any other process claims.”)).
50
Id. at 1372 n.2 (citing In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
51
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374.
52
Id. at 1375.
53
Id. at 1377.
54
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (1999) (discussing the disconnect between
business method patents and the goals of the patent system in general).
47
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55

genres, from manufactured biological processes to business method
56
57
patents, even to the absurd. Furthermore, in addition to seeking
patents for machines, manufactures or compositions of matter, inventors
seek to fully monopolize the field by patenting the related process as
well. Many respond negatively to patents on both products and
processes in the biotechnology field due to the implications of such
58
information on healthcare. However, on balance, those within the
biotechnology field as well as other up-and-coming industries, are
concerned that limiting patent eligibility at the outset of a claim
examination will effectively push out claims from emerging fields based
59
on an inability to conform to an outmoded conception of “process.” As
opposed to other industries, which may or may not require extensive
60
funding, the cost of research and development in the biotech industry
61
reaches into the billions and in turn relies on its exclusive rights for
profit and capital to continue developing new products. Limiting patent
eligibility in this field would seemingly reduce innovation and increase
secrecy until patentability could be assured.
The line of cases leading up to the Supreme Court’s review of
Bilski v. Kapos and the Federal Circuit’s rehearing of Prometheus,
delineates the debate over where to draw the line for biotechnical
process claims. Although the concern over the continued viability of
business method patents struck fear into the hearts of large corporations,
the uncertainty for diagnosis and treatment method patents affected not
55

See discussion supra of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
See BANK OF AMERICA, https://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/specialprograms/keep-the-change.go (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (stating that currently Bank of
America’s “Keep the Change Program” is listed as patent-pending).
57
TOTALLY ABSURD INVENTIONS, http://totallyabsurd.com (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
58
See Brief for Appellees at 5-6, Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office et al., No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2010), available at
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/brief-for-the-appellees.pdf (“[T]hese patent claims stifle
vital clinical and research practices to the detriment of women’s health and scientific
progress.”).
59
See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U. S. 124 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d. 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting); infra Part
III.
60
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1581-82 (2003) (discussing the industry-specific nature of research and development
expenses and ultimately the incentive-based differences between some fields of innovation
versus others).
61
2008
Investment
in
U.S.
Health
Research,
RESEARCH AMERICA,
http://www.researchamerica.org/uploads/healthdollar08.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
56
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only those corporations controlling the industry but also physicians and
patients alike.
62

A. Labcorp v. Metabolite

Researchers at University Patents Inc. created and patented a
process for testing for homocystine (an amino acid), and then
correlating the concentration with Vitamin B levels in the body to
63
determine vitamin deficiency (‘658 patent). Claim 13 covered any
process (patented or unpatented) for measuring homocystine levels and
64
“correlating” the level with a deficiency in Vitamin B. For example, a
physician can satisfy the correlation step when she notes the test level
and makes a mental comparison to a normal level. Metabolite acquired
the ‘658 patent, and in 1991 sublicensed Labcorp to use the process in
65
its research. The agreement contained a provision allowing Labcorp to
terminate the agreement if “a more cost effective commercial alternative
is available that does not infringe a valid and enforceable claim of” the
66
patent. In 1998, Labcorp began using the Abbot Test, a new method
for measuring homocystine levels, and ceased paying royalties to
67
Metabolite.
Metabolite brought suit against Labcorp claiming patent
infringement and breach of the license agreement. The jury found that
Labcorp’s use of the Abbot Test infringed Claim 13 of the ‘658 patent
and awarded damages for unpaid royalties of more than $4.6 million
68
plus enhanced damages. The district court also enjoined Labcorp from
performing homocystine tests, including the Abbot Test. Labcorp
appealed to the Federal Circuit on the theory that Claim 13 was “invalid
for indefiniteness, lack of written description, non-enablement,

62

Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
63
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2004). This type of deficiency can cause numerous ailments including “vascular disease,
cognitive dysfunction, birth defects and cancer. If detected early enough, however, vitamin
supplements readily treat the deficiency.” Id.
64
Id.
65
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 128 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 129. Labcorp claimed that the new test was a better alternative to the ‘658
patent and therefore could take advantage of the termination provision in the licensing
agreement. Id.
68
Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359.
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69

anticipation, and obviousness.” Furthermore, Labcorp argued that
allowing Claim 13 to stand would allow Metabolite to “improperly gain
a monopoly over a basic scientific fact rather than a novel invention of
70
its own.” The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, finding Claim
71
13 to be patentable. The court declined to address Labcorp’s assertion
that allowing Claim 13 to stand is tantamount to allowing a patent for a
72
law of nature. The Supreme Court granted certiorari but later dismissed
73
the case as improvidently granted based on a procedural fault:
Labcorp, although referring to the issue, had never specifically asserted
74
that Claim 13 violated 35 U.S.C. § 101 in the lower courts.
Despite the dismissal of the writ, both the Supreme Court’s
willingness to grant certiorari and Justice Breyer’s heated dissent joined
by two other justices, demonstrate the current uncertainty surrounding
the scope of subject matter eligibility for process claims in the
biotechnology field. In his dissent, Justice Breyer stated that “[C]laim
13 is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets” the
75
phenomenon of nature doctrine. Furthermore, the relationship between
the process for measuring homocystine levels using either a patented or
unpatented test and a vitamin deficiency is a natural occurrence
76
observed through biology. Justice Breyer argued that the ability to
patent a determination made in the mind of a physician extends patent
77
law too far and subverts the purpose of this body of law. Breyer
concluded his dissent with a policy argument for limiting the scope of
78
patentability in order to protect the medical profession. Articulating the
79
“anti-commons argument,” Breyer focused on the high transaction
69

Id (citing Brief for Appellant, at 38).
Id (citing Brief for Appellant, at 41).
71
Id. at 1358.
72
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 131 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73
Id. at 125.
74
Id. at 132 (Breyer, J., dissenting). (Justice Breyer also found sufficient procedural
grounds upon which the Court should have heard the case, citing both the parties’ briefs to
the Court and their arguments below as evidence of a prior dispute as to subject matter
eligibility).
75
Id. at 135.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 136.
78
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 138. (The Court’s failure to invalidate this patent claim
“threatens to leave the medical profession subject to the restrictions. . ..”).
79
See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998), available
at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698 (discussing how the
70
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costs associated with an increased distribution of patents. The
transaction costs of exclusivity affect physicians’ abilities to practice
medicine efficiently by imposing time, energy and financial
80
constraints. Consequently, the overflow of these problems hinders the
healthcare system as a whole. To avoid confusion or decreased
investment due to uncertainty, Breyer reasoned that the Court should
address this issue to provide clarity as to the legal rights and obligations
81
of medical practitioners.
82

B. In re Bilski

Considered the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to
narrow the scope of §101, Bilski focused not on a biotechnical process,
but rather on a method of doing business. The claim at issue was drawn
83
on a method for hedging risk in commodities markets. The process
required an intermediary to buy from both the supplier and the
consumer at fixed costs thereby assuring quantity and price while
84
hedging the risk involved in the commodities market. The U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office examiner and later the Board of Patent Appeals,
rejected the claim, finding that it failed to demonstrate a meaningful
transformation because it entails only intangible elements — “nonphysical financial risks and legal liabilities of the commodity provider,
85
the consumer, and the market-participants.” In other words, the method
attempted to claim an abstract idea.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered several judicially-created
tests for determining subject matter eligibility for process claims. The
first of these tests, the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test, was defined and
articulated over the course of three opinions arising out of the United
86
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The test sets forth two
steps: (1) determine whether the claim recites an “algorithm;” and, (2)
privatization and exclusivity of patent rights can actually hinder innovation downstream
when researchers require multiple licenses to perform those tasks necessary to bring about a
new innovation).
80
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S at 138.
81
Id.
82
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
83
Id.at 949.
84
Id. at 950.
85
Id.
86
See, e.g., In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).

BEFELER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011

5/5/2011 7:38 PM

PATENT ELIGIBILITY FOR DIAGNOSTIC METHODS

497

determine whether that algorithm is “applied in any manner to physical
87
elements or process steps.” The Federal Circuit in State Street doubted
whether this test had survived Supreme Court scrutiny after Diehr and
88
Chakrabarty. Relying on these opinions, the majority in Bilski
concluded that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is “inadequate” in that “a
89
claim failing [this] test may nonetheless be patent-eligible.”
The court in State Street referred to the second of these tests, the
“useful, concrete, and tangible result,” as a way of showing that certain
types of nonconforming subject matter — i.e. mathematical algorithms
— are nothing more than abstract ideas until given a practical
90
application at which point they satisfy § 101. While in certain
instances this test provided clarity as to whether a claim was drawn to a
fundamental concept, the court in Bilski found it insufficient to
91
determine patent eligibility. The third and final test considered by the
court, a technological arts test, represented a quasi-attempt to reinstate
specific field exceptions. Although dissimilar from the business method
and mathematical algorithm exceptions proposed in State Street, which
sought to exclude certain subject matter, a technological arts test would
restrict subject matter to only those inventions involving applied science
92
or mathematics. The court refused to adopt such a test on the premise
that that defining “technological arts” and “technology” proved far too
93
“ambiguous and ever-changing.” Further, the court would not entertain
implementing “field-of-use” limitations, stating that such limitations
could not transform a claim for a fundamental process into a patentable
94
claim.
The Federal Circuit resolved the conflict over which test to apply
by holding that the MOT test is the sole test by which subject matter
95
eligibility should be determined. The court did acknowledge that this
test perhaps contradicted prior standards enunciated in the Supreme

87

Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959 (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905-07).
State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
89
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959.
90
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
banc)).
91
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60.
92
Id. at 960.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 954.
88
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96

Court, even suggesting that its own test would require refinement in
97
light of future technology. Judge Michel began his opinion by
discussing “process” claims (conceding that Bilski’s claim would meet
the literal definition found in § 101), and delineating three instances
where such claims can never constitute patentable subject matter: those
that attempt to preempt laws of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
98
ideas. The real issue requires determining whether the claim “recites a
fundamental principle, and, if so, whether it would pre-empt
99
substantially all uses of that fundamental principle.” Determining
whether the claim is sufficiently limited in scope requires that the court
adopt a test that efficiently cabins claims for abstract ideas. The court
based its reasoning on the theory that where a claim is drawn to a
machine or involves a transformation, it transcends abstract subject
matter to create a tangible, useful method or process. While this is
somewhat similar to the “useful, concrete, and tangible result”
100
promulgated by State Street, the Bilski test extends one step further by
defining how such a result can be obtained.
The MOT test is a two-pronged inquiry whereby an applicant can
satisfy either by demonstrating that his or her claim is (1) tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms a particular article
101
into a different state of thing. Two limitations apply to this test. First,
the use of a specific machine or transformation of an article must
impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to impart patent102
eligibility. Second, the machine or transformation step cannot be an
103
insignificant extra-solution activity, an example of which is an
insufficient data-gathering step used to disguise a claim drawn to an
104
algorithm as a patent-eligible claim. The court stressed that the
96

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (the Court supplemented its holding by
stating that it “[did] not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the
requirements of [its] prior precedent.”).
97
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955-56 (“Nevertheless, we agree that future developments in
technology and the science may present difficult challenges to the machine-ortransformation test . . . the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to alter or perhaps even set
aside this test to accommodate emerging technologies[.]”).
98
Id. at 952.
99
Id. at 954.
100
State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
101
Bilski, 545 F.3d. at 961.
102
Id. (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72).
103
Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
104
See In re Gram, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989). But see In re Abele, 684 F.2d
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“transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed
105
process.” Accordingly, at least two specific processes automatically
qualify as a transformation: chemical or physical transformations of a
106
physical object or substance, and an electronic transformation of data
into a visual depiction so long as the claim is limited to a practical
107
application of the fundamental principle. The court elaborated further
on the concept of “insufficient data-gathering” by repeating its holding
from In re Gram that the process of performing clinical tests and
subsequently determining results and causes is not sufficiently
108
transformative.
Applying the MOT test to the claim at hand, the Federal Circuit
109
concluded that Bilski could not satisfy either prong. The process
lacked involvement of any physical objects and/or substances. The only
transformation to occur would shift an intangible concept of risk. The
110
real exchange is that of “legal rights.” Because the Bilski claim neither
was tied to a machine nor transformed an article, it could not satisfy the
court’s new patent-eligibility standard. Furthermore, as a matter of
policy, the claim was drawn on a purely mental process involving a
mathematical calculation of risk in the mind of the intermediary, and
111
then action on such a determination by consummating the sale. If the
claimed process could be patented, it would preempt “any application of
112
the fundamental concept of hedging.”
Three judges responded with strong dissents specifically
disagreeing with the adoption of the MOT test and the unwillingness of
the court to follow prior precedent (State Street), or in the alternative
overrule it. Judge Newman charged the majority with rewriting the term
“process” in § 101 by limiting this category of patent claims to the
113
MOT test in light of an ever-expanding technological climate. She
902, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
105
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
106
Id.; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (involving a patent for a
process of curing rubber).
107
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63 (discussing the holding in Abele, involving the twodimensional depiction of X-ray data of bones, organs and other tissue).
108
Id. at 963.
109
Id. at 963-64.
110
Id. at 964.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 965.
113
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This exclusion of process
inventions is contrary to statute, contrary to precedent, and a negation of the constitutional
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114

reasoned that “uncertainty is the enemy” when it comes to emerging
115
fields of art, which in turn will disincentivize innovation. The court
should have concerned itself with a forward-looking perspective as to
116
the effects on innovation-based commerce. The test should remain as
it is stated in the statute — requiring new and useful processes — and
recognize as ineligible only “fundamental truths, laws of nature, and
117
abstract ideas.” Bilski’s claim, in Judge Newman’s opinion, has yet to
118
be evaluated for patentability.
Judge Mayer took a different approach, suggesting the majority
had not gone far enough and called for State Street to be overruled,
119
thereby excluding all business methods from patent protection.
Applying the “technological arts test,” Judge Mayer looked to the
Constitution for Congress’ authority to protect the “useful arts,” a term
120
we now interpret to mean technological innovations. Judge Mayer also
engaged in an incentives-based analysis comparing business method
121
patents like that at issue in Bilksi to pharmaceutical industry patents.
Whereas businesses have a built-in incentive to “stay ahead of [the]
122
competition, and to make more profit,” the front-end costs and the
high risks associated with the drug industry demand a reliance on strong
123
patent protection. Because Bilski’s claim was based on business
124
principles, it would not fall within patent eligible criteria.
Lastly, Judge Rader expressed in his dissent that this case could
have been decided simply on the premise that Bilski attempted to claim
125
an abstract idea. He believed that the majority relied on portions of
previous Supreme Court opinions, taken out of context, to create a test
that “ties our patent system to dicta from an industrial age decades
mandate. Its impact on the future, as well as on the thousands of patents already granted, is
unknown.”).
114
Id. at 977.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 995.
117
Id. at 997.
118
Id.
119
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
120
Id. at 1001 (citing Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en
banc)).
121
Id. at 1005-06.
122
Id. at 1005.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1010.
125
Bilski, 545 F.3d. at 1011.
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126

removed from the bleeding edge.” The approach taken by the majority
does little to explain why the expansive language found in § 101 should
127
suddenly be confined to the MOT test. In other words, “why should
128
some categories of invention deserve no protection?” The Supreme
Court has determined that the only limitations to the eligibility
requirement in § 101 apply to natural laws, natural phenomena, and
129
abstract ideas. These concepts encompass those things that cannot be
130
invented at all. Finally, § 101 was purposefully written as a broad
131
gatekeeper. This section still requires that the claim meet the other
132
“conditions and requirements” of Title 35.
Toward the end of his dissent, Judge Rader dovetailed the § 101
133
discussion in Bilski with Justice Breyer’s Labcorp dissent. He pointed
to a clear distinction between the unpatentable relationship between
homocysteine levels and low folate as opposed to the patentable method
134
of detecting and treating said condition. As important as considering
the language of the statute (which, in terms of § 101, Rader found the
process in Labcorp patentable) is a reliance on the policy justifications
derived from the Constitutional mandate — to utilize patents for the
135
advancement of science and the useful arts. The MOT test leaves
potential innovators unsure of the current law and understandably wary
about investing large sums of money for potentially unpatentable
136
processes. The far-reaching consequences of this decision risk
“hobbling” advances and “may not incentivize, but [instead] complicate
137
our search for the vast secrets of nature.” While the subject matter of
126

Id.
Id. at 1012.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 1012-13 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
130
Id. at 1013.
131
Bilski,545 F.3d. at 1012.
132
Id. at 1014.
133
See infra Part III(A).
134
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader, J., dissenting).
135
Id.; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 60 at 1581-82.
136
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader, J., dissenting) (expressing his concern that research
for conditions such as Lou Gerhrig’s disease or Parkinson’s will taper off due to such
instability in the system); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2008) (the statutory safe harbor
provision protecting those uses “reasonably related to the development and submission of
information to the FDA”). But see Marcia Angell, The Truth about Drug Companies, 51
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 12, Jul. 15, 2004, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17244
(discussing the billions of dollars earned by pharmaceuticals in the drug industry).
137
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting).
127
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Bilski’s business method patent “is seemingly far removed from
138
diagnostic claims,” the underlying determination of whether § 101 is
met will have to conform to the same test regardless of whether the
claims arise out of very different fields.
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and more than
139
seven months after hearing arguments for Bilski v. Kappos, the Court
issued its opinion in June 2010 affirming the Federal Circuit’s finding
140
that Bilski’s patent could not meet the § 101 standard. The Court,
however rejected the notion that the MOT test could be the sole test for
141
patent eligibility, providing little in the way of guiding precedent.
Specifically, the Court concluded that, “the machine-or-transformation
test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining
142
whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101.”
While all nine Justices agreed that the patent claim failed under §
101, four Justices, in a concurrence written by Justice Stevens,
expressed a strong sentiment that business methods should not be
143
patent-eligible at all. The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, focused mostly on discrediting a narrow reading of patent
eligibility by reference to prior case law and interpreting the statutory
144
wording in its “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”
The Court, in refusing to define a test for patentability, succeeded
only in endorsing the possibility that business methods could be patent
eligible, while maintaining the current uncertainty regarding the
145
patentability of diagnostic methods. This reasoning was subject to
harsh criticism from Stevens in his concurrence. The majority’s reliance
on prior patent case law coupled with its insistence on not limiting the
doctrine beyond the literal word in the Patent Act, means that the
“analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the correct outcome in this
case, but it also means that the Court’s musings on this issue stand for
138
Kevin E. Noonan, Applying In re Bilski to Diagnostic Method Claims, PATENT DOCS
(Feb, 5, 2009, 3:07 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/09/applying-in-re-bilski-todiagnostic-method-claims.html.
139
Bilski v. Kappos (Bilski II), 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
140
Id. at 3231.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 3227.
143
Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“More precisely, although a process is not
patent-ineligible simply because it is useful for conducting business, a claim that merely
describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a ‘process’ under § 101.”).
144
Id. at 3226 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
145
Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. at 3228.
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146

very little.” What this opinion means for diagnostic tests would be the
focus of the next two cases, Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo
Collaborative Services and Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen,
each to be considered for a second time in the Federal Circuit upon the
Supreme Court’s issuance of GVR Orders one day after deciding
147
Bilski.
148

C. Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Collaborative Services
(Prometheus I and II)

The first of these cases, Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo
Collaborative Services, involves a process for determining the correct
dosage for thiopurine drugs used in the treatment of gastrointestinal and
149
After the drug is
non-gastrointestinal autoimmune disorder.
administered to a patient, the body breaks it down into its metabolite
150
components, specifically 6-MMP and 6-TG, commonly used for their
151
immunosuppressive properties. Calibrating the correct dosage for use
in patients suffering from Crohn’s Disease and inflammatory bowel
diseases require a patient-specific analysis to “optimize therapeutic
152
efficacy while minimizing toxic side effects.” As such, the process
involves two steps: (1) administering the drug to the subject, and (2)
determining the level of the drug’s metabolites and comparing those
measurements to pre-determined levels in order to adjust the level
146

Id. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVR- And an
Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711, 712 (2009) (“[T]he procedure for summarily granting
certiorari, vacating the decision below without finding error, and remanding the case for
further consideration by the lower court. The GVR is most commonly used when the ruling
below might be affected by one of the Court’s recently rendered decisions, which was
issued after the lower court ruled.”).
148
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 628 F.3d 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus I), 581
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
149
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d. at 1339.
150
These stand for 6-mthyl-mercaptopurine and 6-thioguanine. Significant research
regarding 6-TG has determined that it can very often lead to toxicity if not monitored with
extreme care. Chris J.J. Mulder, et al., On Tolerability and Safety of a Maintenance
Treatment with 6-Thioguanine in Azathioprine or 6-Mercaptopurine Intolerant IBD
Patients, 11(35) WORLD J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 5540 (2005), available at
http://www.wjgnet.com/1007-9327/11/5540.asp (suggesting the importance of providing for
a specific system of administration and analysis).
151
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1339.
152
Id.
147
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153

accordingly. The Mayo Clinic had previously received a license to use
Prometheus’ test, but in 2004 announced that it would begin utilizing its
154
own test, which used different levels to determine toxicity.
On granting Mayo’s motion for summary judgment, the district
court found significant bars to eligibility under § 101. The court began
by characterizing the test as a combination of “‘administering’ and
‘determining’ steps [that] are merely necessary data-gathering steps for
any use of the correlations and that as construed, the final step — the
155
‘warning’ step. . .is only a mental step.” According to the district
court, this correlation represented an expression of a natural process,
“and the inventors merely observed the relationship between these
156
naturally produced metabolites and therapeutic efficacy and toxicity.”
Since the patent was drawn to the correlations specifically, it would
wholly preempt a natural phenomenon and was thus ineligible under §
101.
1. Prometheus I
Applying the Bilski machine or transformation test, the Federal
Circuit disagreed, finding the claims patentable because they satisfied
the transformation prong of the MOT test at two different junctures in
157
the process. First, the court found that the administration of the drug
into the body creates a transformation of the drug, and “various
chemical and physical changes of the drug’s metabolites that enable
158
their concentrations to be determined.” Where the court below framed
the claim as one involving a process of correlations, Judge Lourie
viewed the claims as “methods of treatment, which are always
transformative when a defined group of drugs is administered to the
159
body to ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition.” Innately this
process should be characterized as a treatment, the goal of which is a
153

Id.
Id. at 1340.
155
Id. at 1341 (quoting Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008)).
156
Id.
157
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1345-46. Prometheus also attempted to persuade the court
that a third transformation occurred when the “metabolite levels are transformed into a
warning for a doctor to alter the dosage,” but the court affirmed the lower court’s
determination that this represented merely a mental step. Id.
158
Id. at 1346.
159
Id.
154
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160

transformation in the body. In its argument on appeal, Prometheus
distinguished the transformation that occurs as the result of the
161
administration of the drug, rather than as a result of a natural process.
Agreeing with this assertion, the court relied on Bilski I for approval in
that “it is virtually self-evident that a process for a chemical or physical
transformation of physical objects or substances is patent-eligible
162
subject matter.”
Second, the court found that the determining step is also
transformative because it involves manipulation of the data in such a
way that “at the end of the process, the human sample is no longer
163
human blood; human tissue is no longer human tissue.” These
164
measurements are an integral part of making the determination. The
manipulation of both the chemical and physical properties of the
165
physical samples is sufficient to meet the Bilski transformation prong.
The court also addressed the secondary limitation imposed by the
MOT test: the process must not be “merely insignificant extra-solution
166
activity.”
As explained above, the court considered these
transformations the primary objective of the process, without which
there would be no claim. The court distinguished this type of diagnostic
167
test from that claimed in In re Gram. In Gram, the applicant sought to
patent a process involving (1) clinical testing, and (2) a determination of
168
whether an abnormality existed based on the findings. Based on those
facts the court found only a mathematical algorithm combined with a
data-gathering step, rather than the series of transformative steps found
169
in Prometheus’ process.
Unlike the clinical test in Gram,
160

Id.
Id. Prometheus attempts to draw clear distinctions similar to those discussed in
Judge Rader’s dissent in Bilski. Science in general involves the manipulation of natural
principles arising out of physics, chemistry, and so on. Even when man-made inventions put
these principles to use, it is the ultimate representation of progress — a deeper
understanding of the world and its inner workings. Id.
162
Id. at 1346-47 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
163
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1347 (quoting the Declaration of Prometheus’ expert, Dr.
Yves Théorêt).
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590
(1978)).
167
In re Gram, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
168
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1348.
169
Id.
161
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“Prometheus’s claimed methods are not ‘merely’ data-gathering steps or
‘insignificant extra-solution activity’; they are part of treatment regimes
170
for various diseases using thiopurine drugs.”
As a final consideration, the court dismissed any notion that the
inclusion of a mental step within the process could be dispositive stating
that, “a subsequent mental step will not negate the transformative nature
171
172
of prior steps.” The claim must be viewed as a whole. Specifically,
the final step in the Prometheus test, the “warning” step, does not
173
invalidate the transformative nature of the whole process.
2. Prometheus II
The Supreme Court issued a GRV order summarily granting
certiorari, vacating the court of appeals’ judgment, and remanding to the
174
Federal Circuit based on the court’s holding in Bilski II. Because the
Bilski II opinion made it clear that the MOT test could still provide
useful guidance on the patentability issue, the Federal Circuit saw no
175
need to reanalyze Prometheus under a different standard. While the
court did apply the MOT test in Prometheus I in finding a
transformation on two levels, it also determined that the claim was not
drawn to a law of nature or natural phenomenon and therefore could not
176
preempt all uses of the recited correlations. Revisiting this language in
Prometheus II, the court,
[D]id not think that either the Supreme Court’s GVR Order or the
Court’s Bilski decision dictates a wholly different analysis or a
different result on remandFalseThe Supreme Court’s decision in
Bilski did not undermine our preemption analysis of Prometheus’s
claims and it rejected the machine-or-transformation test only as a
definitive test. The Court merely stated that “[t]he Court of Appeals
incorrectly concluded that this Court has endorsed the machine-or170

Id.
Id. at 1348.
172
Id. at 1349 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven though
a fundamental principle itself is not patent-eligible, processes incorporating a fundamental
principle may be patent-eligible. Thus, it is irrelevant that any individual step or limitation
of such processes by itself would be unpatentable under section 101.”).
173
Id.
174
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010)
(mem.).
175
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 628 F.3d
1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
176
Id.
171
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transformation test as the exclusive test.” 130 U.S. at 3226 (emphasis
added). . . . Thus, the Court did not disavow the machine-ortransformation test. And, as applied to the present claims, the “useful
and important clue, an investigative tool,” leads to a clear and
compelling conclusion, viz., that the present claims pass muster
under § 101. They do not encompass laws of nature or preempt
177
natural correlations.

The opinion leaves little doubt that the patent eligibility issue has
yet to be resolved, despite the Federal Circuit’s willingness to
seemingly broaden its view of diagnostic method patents under § 101.
The court even referenced the multiple citations in Bilski II to Justice
Breyer’s strong dissent in Labcorp, regarding the dangers of patenting
biomedical correlations, as “fail[ing] to transform a dissent into
178
controlling law.” Without limitations imposed from the outside, it is
unlikely that the Federal Circuit will independently narrow its analysis
of similar biotechnology process claims.
179

D. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen

Currently on remand from the Supreme Court, Classen involves a
series of patents held by Classen for a process of evaluating and
180
improving the safety of immunization schedules. Classen claimed
Biogen infringed these patents when Biogen examined the correlation
between certain vaccination schedules and immune deficiencies and
ultimately developed a vaccine using this data. The district court relied
on the natural phenomenon exclusion discussed in Diamond v. Diehr in
181
finding that the patent attempted to claim a natural phenomenon. The
court stated that determining patentability requires looking at the patent
as a whole, and while variation on a previous process may still qualify,
“[i]nsignificant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable
182
principle into a patentable process.” The court analyzed the limitations
177

Id.
Id. at 1356 n.2.
179
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(unpublished decision).
180
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, Civ. No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 98106, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006).
181
Id. at *11-14 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“Einstein could
not patent his celebrated law that E = mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of
gravity. Such discoveries are manifestations of nature free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.”)).
182
Id. at *12 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188).
178
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inherent in patenting both abstract ideas and natural phenomenon, and,
declining to consider each theory separately, concluded that Classen’s
patent involved merely “thinking about” the connection between
vaccination schedules and immune deficiency — a correlation
183
determined by biology, not human ingenuity.
The opinion is somewhat unclear as to why the court ultimately
relied on the “natural phenomenon” principle. In a single-line,
unpublished affirmation of the decision, the Federal Circuit cited its
184
holding in Bilski as controlling. The court provided no further
explanation as to why Dr. Classen’s patent failed to meet the
transformation test. The Supreme Court also issued a GVR Order for
185
Classen based on the Court’s holding in Bilski. As of the date of this
Note, the Federal Circuit has yet to issue another opinion with regards
to Classen.
IV. FINDING A PROPER BALANCE TO THE COMPETING
POLICY INTERESTS UNDERLYING THE DEBATE OVER
ELIGIBILITY OF DIAGNOSTIC METHOD PATENTS UNDER §
101
The inability of other mechanisms to successfully incentivize
spending for research and development in the biotechnology industry
suggests that patent protection for diagnostic methods is the best means
186
of encouraging the progress of the useful arts. Private rights afford
exclusivity, which in turn provides the economic incentive to invest in
187
burgeoning innovations. Without such security, the billions of dollars
invested in the industry would undoubtedly decrease. The tradeoff for
exclusivity contemplated by Congress is the supposed benefit derived
183

Id. at *15. The district court’s exact language uses a combination of terms in its
decision, finding that “it would appear that the 139 and 739 patents are an indirect attempt
to patent the idea that there is a relationship between vaccine schedules and chronic immune
mediated disorders, the Court finds they are an attempt to patent an unpatentable natural
phenomenon.” Id. (emphasis added).
184
Classen Immunotherapies, 304 F. App’x at 867 (“In light of our decision in In re
Bilski,, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment that these claims are
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dr. Classen’s claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine
or apparatus’ nor do they ‘transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing.’
Therefore we affirm.” (citations omitted)).
185
Id.
186
See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 41 (2009).
187
See 2008 Investment in U.S. Health Research, supra note 61.
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from new and useful inventions later bestowed upon society. Because of
the diverse and unique nature of a patent system that applies to many
different industries, amending the Patent Act to reflect varying
eligibility requirements or adopting overly restrictive tests, such as the
MOT test, would undermine the purposefully broad sweep of the Patent
Act.
Given the rationales for patent protection, coupled with the Federal
Circuit’s application of the MOT test in Prometheus II, the future of
patentability for diagnostic method patents looks promising. A claim
will almost assuredly meet the § 101 standard where the process is
similar to that in Prometheus, in which the court considered either the
“administering” step or the “determining” step transformative. As the
Federal Circuit stated in Prometheus, “methods of treatment . . . are
always transformative when . . . drugs [are] administered to the body to
188
ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition.”
The relevant policy concerns for the disallowance of patent
protection for diagnostic methods focus on the fear that privatizing
diagnostic methods will impede the practice of medicine and
significantly increase costs for patients. In order to balance the
competing rationales of incentivizing the industry and promoting the
public welfare, this Note suggests that Congress consider an amendment
to the Medical Practitioner Exception under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), which
would eliminate the availability of a remedy where a physician infringes
189
a pure process patent or a biotechnology process patent. This would
meet the competing demands halfway by still prohibiting the
infringement of a valid patent and protecting the patentee from unlawful
use of the patented process by research competitors or even third parties
who facilitated infringement, but would now recognize the importance
of allowing physicians to diagnose and treat patients by the most
appropriate means available.

188

Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. May Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus I), 581 F.3d 1336,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
189
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical Process Patents —
Monopolizing the Delivery of Health Care, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2036, 2039 (2006),
available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/faculty/michellemello/files/Labcorp_published
version.pdf.
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A. The Medical Practitioner Exception to Patent Infringement
Remedies
Although the harmonizing of United States patent law with
international law is a complex topic outside the scope of this Note,
Congress’ addition of § 287(c) to the Patent Act, in light of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
190
(hereinafter “TRIPS”), suggests an unwillingness to deny patents for
191
diagnostic testing. Specifically, TRIPS Article 27.3 allows members to
deny patentability for “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for
192
the treatment of humans or animals.” Originally, Congress refused to
193
adopt any portion of Article 27.3. However, public outrage over a
194
surgical patent lawsuit sparked reform, resulting in the adoption of
legislation designed specifically to protect physicians and other
healthcare providers from patent infringement liability pertaining to the
195
use of certain medical procedures. Even though Congress carved out
this exception, it did so while preserving the prohibition against
196
Specifically, the rule defines
unlicensed use of a process patent.
exempted “medical activity” as,
[T]he performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but
shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of
a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent,
or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology

190
See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
art. 27.3(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter “TRIPS”]; WTO and the TRIPS
HEALTH
ORG.
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy
Agreement,
WORLD
/wto_trips/en/index.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
191
John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 685, 722-23 (2002).
192
TRIPS, supra note 190.
193
Duffy, supra note 191, at 722.
194
Id. at 722 n.121 (“Method of Making Self-Sealing Episcleral Incision,” U.S. Pat. No.
5,080,111 (issued Jan.14, 1992)).
195
35 U.S.C. § 287 (1999). The statute states, in relevant part:
With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that
constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the
provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against
the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to
such medical activity.
196
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii).
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197

The Medical Practitioner Exception represents a Congressional
understanding that while some medical procedures are viable candidates
for patentability, patent enforcement against physicians can represent an
198
unfair burden on the medical profession. Furthermore, where a patient
requires surgical treatment, such necessity reaffirms the principle that
199
the “embarrassment of a patent” must yield in certain circumstances.
As currently written, however, § 287(c) narrowly covers only medical
or surgical procedures, while excluding the practice of patented
biotechnology processes — an often necessary component to medical
diagnosis and treatment. In order to better reflect the policy rationales
underlying the medical practitioner carve-out, a legislative solution is
necessary.
B. The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002
Recent reform measures have attempted to incorporate this concept
by amending the infringement liability section of the Patent Act to limit
the impact of gene patenting on the medical community. While such
measures have yet to garner significant support, one in particular can
provide a germane perspective on how the Medical Practitioner
Exception to patent infringement could be amended so as to exempt
physicians from liability for the use of certain biomedical process
patents. Specifically, in an initial attempt to amend § 287,
Representative Lynn Rivers (Democrat-MI) introduced The Genomic
Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 (hereinafter
200
“GRDAA”), aimed at establishing “limited exemptions from liability
for certain uses of patented genetic sequences and genetic sequence
197

Id. (emphasis added).
Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (citing
statements of Senator Frist:”My legislation would prevent the enforcement of so-called pure
medical procedure patents against health professionals . . . [T]his narrowly tailored
legislation would in no way discourage the important research being done in these areas of
medicine. . . . My legislation is very narrow in scope. It would simply prevent the
enforcement of patents against health professional or their affiliated facilities for pure
procedure patents . . . .”).
199
Id.; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html (“Considering the
exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I
know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”).
200
GRDAA, supra note 7.
198
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information in the context of basic research and genetic diagnostic
201
testing.” In relevant part, the GRDAA proposed an exemption from
“infringement remedies” for the performance by a medical practitioner
of any “genetic diagnostic, prognostic, or predictive test or a medical or
202
surgical procedure.”
As the first among many attempts to regulate gene patenting and
associated process patents, the GRDAA focuses solely on genetic
203
correlations, but excludes “pure process patents” such as the vitamin
deficiency correlations in Labcorp or the treatment method comprising
measurement of metabolites and dosage regulation in Prometheus.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of this provision is rendered moot where
the patentee also owns a patent for the underlying product or drug. For
example, in a case currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Myriad’s patent claims both isolated DNA for the BRCA gene and a
204
corresponding method for comparing DNA. Liability would still
attach for a physician in these scenarios because testing involves using
205
both the gene and the process.
As compared to later, more aggressive legislation aimed at
206
completely barring gene-related patents, GRDAA focuses narrowly on
addressing the concerns of gene patent critics especially in relation to
the impact on the medical community. The exception for infringement
liability would only apply to physicians, while third parties performing
the test (for example, test kit suppliers) would still face liability under
201

Christopher M. Holman, Recent Legislative Proposals Aimed at the Perceived
Problem of Gene Patenting, 2008 A.B.A. SEC. OF SCI. & TECH. L. 2, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/scitech/biotech/pdfs/recent_legislati
ve_chris_holman.authcheckdam.pdf.
202
GRDAA, supra note 7.
203
Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 189, at 2039.
204
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office et al.,
No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at *149 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010). As of the
date of this Note’s publication, the Federal Circuit is currently considering the issue of the
subject matter eligibility for DNA as a composition of matter as well as the patentability of
the corresponding method claim. See Federal Circuit Hears Myriad Gene Patent Case,
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 4, 2011, 6:45 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/04/federalcircuit-hears-myriad-gene-patent-case.html.
205
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention. . . any patented
invention. . . infringes the patent.”) (emphasis added).
206
See generally Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong.
(2007).
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207

direct or indirect infringement. Despite the GRDAA’s modest focus,
Congress did not amend the Medical Practitioner Exception.
C. Proposals for Amending § 287(c)
In a 2006 New England Journal of Medicine article, written in
response to Labcorp, Aaron Kesselheim and Michelle Mello discuss the
208
impact of process patents from a clinician’s perspective. The article
identified three categories of process patents encountered by physicians:
pure process patents, processes related to patented drugs or products,
209
and techniques used to isolate compounds or build devices. With
regards to the first type, pure process patents, the patent is only drawn to
the process and not to an underlying patented product. The problem
associated with such patents illuminates the same issues targeted by
Justice Breyer in his Labcorp dissent. While ordering the test would
constitute infringement, “‘it would be malpractice’ for a doctor to
receive an assay result showing elevated total homocysteine levels and
210
not consider cobalamin or folate deficiency as a cause.”
In order to eliminate this exposure to risk, the article targets the
first two categories of processes utilized by physicians and suggests that
appropriate action must be taken either by the courts or Congress. First,
the Patent Office and the courts should apply a “more critical eye” to
such process claims and invalidate patents where the process involves
only a procedural step instead of an actual transformation. As the case
law has demonstrated, this result is unlikely. In the alternative, the
article offers a legislative solution whereby § 287(c) would be amended
to expand the definition of “medical activity” to include pure process
211
patents and those patents involving use of a patented product or drug.
This amendment reflects a more comprehensive protection for
physicians than that offered by the GRDAA by extending the exception
to all processes instead of only gene-related processes. In truth, the
authors consider abolition of patent protection for most medical process
patents the most appealing alternative, but they recognize that a “sea
207

Holman, supra note 201, at 3.
Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 189, at 2039.
209
Id. at 2039-40. The third type of process, “techniques used to isolate compounds or
build devices,” is an important research tool and can contribute to innovations in the
development of diagnostic test, but does not directly impact patient care. Id.
210
Id. at 2039 (quoting Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d
1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
211
Id. at 2040.
208
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change” in the law is unlikely and probably too severe a measure
considering the harmful impact on business arrangements and existing
212
patents.
It is the middle ground that affords the best opportunity to meet the
goals of patent law while safeguarding physicians from unethical
intrusions into the practice of medicine. Exempting pure process patents
and biotechnology process patents from infringement liability for
physicians would cover correlations and diagnostic and treatment
methods that form the basis for personalized medical care, an integral
component to better and more effective patient care. A narrowly tailored
exemption, one that would not cover processes related to patented drugs
and devices specifically, resembles many of the same concerns inherent
in § 287(c): allowing the unhindered practice of medicine while not
213
declaring such patents invalid.
V. CONCLUSION
The progression of process patent case law over the past few years
lends credence to the theory that subject matter eligibility will once
again fade into the background of patent litigation. The anticipation
leading up to the Supreme Court’s hearing of Bilski only resulted in
reestablishing the § 101 doctrine as it existed previously, while
endowing the Federal Circuit with the ability to apply the MOT test but
refrain from labeling it the exclusive test for determining patentability.
When all was said and done, both Bilksi and Prometheus achieved the
same result. With these cases laid to rest, it appears that diagnostic
method patents, as a category, may be safe from § 101 invalidity so long
as the claim is found not to preempt a fundamental principle.
Once patentability is established, it is the duty of Congress to
weigh the competing policy rationales underlying the protection of this
viable form of patents, while preventing their misuse against physicians
practicing within the parameters of proper patient care. A physician who
is prevented from making certain determinations based on a failure to
obtain a license to use the patented process, retarding the care of a
patient as a consequence, faces an unfair restraint and makes all the
more clear that infringement liability should not be the measure of
healthcare. Amending § 287(c) to include the practice of pure process
212

Id.
Leisa Talbert Peschel, Revisiting the Compromise of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 16 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L. J. 299, 300 (2008).
213
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patents and biotechnology process patents under the definition of
exempted medical activities meets the needs of all involved by seeking
an ethical solution while not compromising the stature of diagnostic
methods as patentable processes. The ever-evolving nature of scientific
advances and biotechnology inventions demands that Congress should
take care in reforming patent law. With that in mind, “limited changes
aimed at making the . . . litigation of biotechnology patents . . . more
efficient could strengthen the patent system and foster greater
214
innovation.”

214

CLAUDE BARFIELD & JOHN E. CALFEE, BIOTECHNOLOGY
BALANCING INNOVATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 91 (2007).

AND THE

PATENT SYSTEM:

